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Controlling the Competitor Plaintiff 
in Antitrust Litigation 
William H. Page* 
and Roger D. Blair** 
In Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 1 Ed-
ward Snyder and Thomas Kauper survey a sample of private antitrust 
cases from the period 1973-1983 and review critically the recent eco-
nomic literature on raising rivals' costs as an exclusionary practice. 
Measuring the sample against the theory, they find relatively few meri-
torious suits brought by competitors of the alleged offenders. 2 They 
also find that the antitrust injury doctrine announced in 1977 in 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc. 3 had no significant effect 
on the relative frequency of competitor suits filed during the period 
covered by the sample. 4 This result, they conclude, suggests that 
Brunswick does not curb misuse of the antitrust laws. Turning to the 
present interpretation of the law, they find that careful pleading can so 
easily circumvent the antitrust injury doctrine that the doctrine holds 
no prospect for stemming the tide of perverse competitors' suits. 5 
Plaintiffs, they argue, may easily get past the pleading stage to the 
merits by modifying their complaints to include the necessary allega-
tions of anticompetitive exclusion. Snyder and Kauper therefore rec-
ommend that the private competitor's suit be abolished and replaced 
by a form of parens patriae suit on behalf of the few legitimately ag-
grieved competitors. 6 
Much in Snyder and Kauper's study is worthy of comment. They 
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versity of Florida. B.A. 1964; M.A. 1966; Ph.D. 1968, Michigan State. - Ed. 
We would like to thank Stephen Calkins, Craig Callen, Herbert Hovenkamp, and John 
Lopatka for their comments. 
1. Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor 
Plaintiff. 90 MICH. L. R.Ev. 551 (1991). 
2. See id. at 575-76. 
3. 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
4. See Snyder & Kauper, supra note l, at 581. 
5. See id. at 581-88. 
6. See id. at 597-98. For an early argument in favor of parens patriae suits in some circum-
stances, see Roger D. Blair, The Sherman Act and the Incentive to Collude, 17 ANTrrRusr BULL. 
433 (1972). 
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have given us a useful picture of private antitrust litigation during the 
period covered by the sample, one that may be more accurate than a 
reading of reported cases from that period would suggest. 7 Moreover, 
their generally critical treatment of the literature on raising rivals' 
costs is clear and focused on the need to draw administrable policy 
conclusions.8 Most noteworthy, however, is their critique of the anti-
trust injury doctrine as a means of controlling unmeritorious or per-
verse suits by competitors. Their argument on this score - based 
upon their analysis of the 1973-1983 data and some more recent anti-
trust injury decisions - is deeply flawed and does not support their 
conclusion that competitor suits should be abolished. We argue here 
that the antitrust injury requirement9 and related procedural devices 
have evolved to address the problem of perverse competitor suits. 
Moreover, the solution that Snyder and Kauper offer for the problem 
will not likely improve upon the traditional methods of the legal 
system. 
I. THE BRUNSWICK DECISION AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
ANTITRUST 
That Snyder and Kauper found no significant difference between 
the relative number of competitors' suits filed before and after the 
Brunswick decision in their sample period is neither surprising nor 
consequential. The development of antitrust law - including the anti-
trust injury doctrine - is evolutionary. As one commentator has 
noted, "the Sherman Act can be regarded as 'enabling' legislation -
an invitation to the federal courts to learn how businesses and markets 
work and formulate a set of rules that will make them work in socially 
7. For extensive examination of the Georgetown antitrust project data described in Snyder & 
Kauper, supra note 1, at 554 & n.15, see PRIVATE ANrrrRUST LmGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, 
NEW LEARNING (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988). 
8. Snyder and Kauper's objection that the raising rivals' costs theories are essentially special 
cases with no strong policy consequences is being voiced with increased frequency. They cite, for 
example, Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND J. 
EcoN. 113 (1989). See also Sam Peltzman, The Handbook of Industrial Organization: A Review 
Article, 99 J. PoL. EcoN. 201, 206 (1991) (observing "the seeming inability of the recent theory 
to lead to any powerful generalization. This is especially true in the area of game theory, where 
this problem seems beyond remediation."). 
9. We have both discussed antitrust injury at length elsewhere. For Page's work, see William 
H. Page, Optimal Antitrust Penalties and Competitors' Injury, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2151 (1990); 
William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust 
Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 15 VA. L. REv. 1221 (1989) [hereinafter Page, Chicago 
School]; William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1445 
(1985); William H. Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust 
Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 467 (1980) [hereinafter Page, Damages and Efficiency]. For Blair's 
work, see, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Gordon L. Lang, Albrecht After ARCO: Maximum Resale 
Price Fixing Moves Toward the Rule of Reason, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1007 (1991); RogerD. Blair & 
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1539 (1989). 
October 1992] Correspondence 113 
efficient ways.''10 In developing antitrust law, the federal courts follow 
the familiar decisional methods of common law courts.11 This process 
requires the gradual development of standards based upon the accu-
mulated knowledge of antitrust cases and the prevailing economic wis-
dom. Consequently, no single decision - especially Brunswick - can 
be expected obviously and immediately to affect private plaintiffs' 
gross filing rates. In dismissing the antitrust injury doctrine based on 
their empirical results, Snyder and Kauper lose sight of this funda-
mental feature of antitrust law. 
Brunswick, in particular, had little immediate impact because even 
informed observers did not view it as an important decision in 1977. 
Consider the following table showing the relative frequency with 
which the antitrust decisions of the 1977 Supreme Court term were 
noted in law reviews:12 
Antitrust Cases, 1977 Supreme Court Term Times Noted in 
Law Reviews 
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 13 28 
Bates v. State Bar 14 26 
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 15 25 
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises 16 6 
Brunswi'ck Corp. v. Pueblo Bow/-0-Mat, Inc. 2 
These figures indicate starkly that Brunswick was not viewed as a 
particularly important or interesting decision. The reasons are appar-
ent from the opinion itself. The decision denied recovery to bowling 
centers that sought treble damages for the loss of profits they would 
have made had their competitors gone under instead of merging ille-
gally with the defendant Brunswick. The Court held that plaintiffs' 
harms, although causally related to an antitrust violation, were not 
compensable under section 4 of the Clayton Act. Because plaintiffs 
were seeking damages for an increase in competition, to permit recov-
10. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, EcONOMlCS AND FEDERAL A.Nrrrausr LAW 52 (1985); see 
also William H. Page, Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust Policy, 66 TuL. L. REv. l, 
36 (1991). For criticism of this tradition in antitrust law, see Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the 
Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 14 CAL. L. REv. 263 (1986). 
11. See, e.g., HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL A.Nrrrausr POLICY 228-29 (1954) ("[l]n 
adopting the standard of the common law Congress expected the courts not only to apply a set of 
somewhat vague doctrines but also in so doing to make use of that 'certain technique of judicial 
reasoning' characteristic of common law courts."). See generally Page, Chicago School, supra 
note 9. 
12. The figures are drawn from the Table of Cases Commented Upon, in 18 INDEX TO LEGAL 
PERIODICALS: SEPTEMBER 1976 TO Auousr 1979, at 1481 (1980). 
13. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
14. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
15. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
16. 429 U.S. 610 (1977). 
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ery would, the Court said, be inconsistent with the antitrust laws.t7 
The decision seemed perfectly reasonable under virtually any interpre-
tation of the antitrust laws. 
Brunswick also, of course, announced the principle that plaintiffs 
must have suffered antitrust injury, that is: "injury of the type the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which 
makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the an-
ticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts 
made possible by the violation."18 In retrospect, we can see that this 
passage announced a very fertile doctrine. But that doctrine, as pres-
ently understood, did not spring fully formed from the Brunswick 
opinion itself like Athena from the head of Zeus; instead, Brunswick 
was a step in an evolutionary process that began before the case and 
has continued ever since. As Snyder and Kauper seem to recognize, 
nascent forms of the antitrust injury doctrine appeared in earlier ap-
pellate decisions. 19 Moreover, the absurdity of the theory of damages 
in Brunswick obscured the reach of the antitrust injury principle for 
years. 
Following Brunswick, some reason existed to think that the anti-
trust injury doctrine might be limited to cases in which the statute at 
issue, like section 7 of the Clayton Act, barred practices with only an 
incipient effect on competition.20 The antitrust injury doctrine might 
also have barred recovery only when the alleged offense actually in-
creased competition. The first full-length article attempting to extend 
the principle to all antitrust damage actions under an economic effi-
ciency rationale did not appear until 1980.21 The Supreme Court re-
solved basic issues under the doctrine in 1981,22 1986,23 and 1990;24 
some fundamental aspects of the principle remain in doubt. During 
this period, the practical importance of antitrust injury in antitrust 
decisionmaking has increased substantially.2s 
17. 429 U.S. at 487-88. 
18. 429 U.S. at 489. 
19. See, e.g., Milton Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented 
Supreme Court Term - 1977, 77 CoLUM. L. REv. 979, 989 (1977) (describing Brunswick as a 
"[c]larification of the [c]oncept of [a]ntitrust [i]njury" and speculating on future developments). 
20. See, e.g., id. at 992 n.76. 
21. See Page, Damages and Efficiency, supra note 9. 
22. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981). 
23. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986). 
24. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990). 
25. The term antitrust injury appeared in only 16 district court opinions in 1978, but its use 
per year increased steadily thereafter, reaching a high of 58 in 1987. The figures are 1978 (16); 
1979 (17); 1980 (21); 1981 (35); 1982 (36); 1983 (39); 1984 (39); 1985 (46); 1986 (54); 1987 (58): 
1988 (53); 1989 (41); 1990 (39); 1991 (41). The figures are based on a Westlaw search of the 
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Given the fact that the antitrust injury principle has emerged 
through an evolutionary process and was not "legislated" in full form 
on the date Brunswick was handed down, one would hardly expect to 
see much difference between the relative frequency of filings by com-
petitor plaintiffs shortly before and shortly after the decision. Because 
antitrust injury was a relatively unformed doctrine in those years, one 
can draw few conclusions from Snyder and Kauper's data about its 
prospective efficacy as a means of controlling strategic or perverse suits 
by competitors. 
II. ANITrRUST INJURY IN PRACTICE 
The second part of Snyder and Kauper's critique of antitrust injury 
does consider the present interpretation of the doctrine, but is no more 
persuasive than their empirical results. After a brief review of the doc-
trine's requirements and its application by the courts, Snyder and 
Kauper state that antitrus~ injury does not effectively bar improper 
competitor suits.26 Their principal basis for this conclusion is a com-
parison of the Supreme Court's decision in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of 
Colorado, Inc., 21 and the district court's decision in Tasty Baking Co. 
v. Ralston Purina Inc. 28 In Cargill, the Court extended the antitrust 
injury requirement to injunction actions, holding that competitors of 
merging firms could not enjoin the merger if the only harm that the 
merger caused them was the result of increased efficiency. Snyder and 
Kauper state that the Court "clearly indicated ... that had there been 
proper allegation and proof of threatened predation, the antitrust in-
jury requirement would have been met."29 They then point to Tasty 
Baking, a case decided shortly after Cargill, in which the district court 
upheld competitor standing to challenge a merger, where the plaintiff 
did allege a threat of predatory pricing by the defendant after the 
merger. Snyder and Kauper continue: "The lesson for competitor 
plaintiffs is clear. Allegations of anticompetitive exclusion, if properly 
framed, will satisfy the antitrust injury requirement. The question 
then becomes one of proof and, for all practical purposes, the case 
FATR-DCT library for the term antitrust injury in each year. This increase occurred during a 
period in which filings of private antitrust cases dropped from 1,457 in 1980 to 521in1990. See 
Maxwell M. Blecher, The Impact of GTE Sylvania on Antitrust Jurisprudence, 60 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 17, 17 & n.2 (1991), (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JUSI'ICE DEPARTMENT 
CHANGES IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND AcnvmES 15 (1990), reprinted in 2 
Trade Reg. Reports (CCH) No. 137 (Dec. 18, 1990)). 
26. See Snyder & Kauper, supra note 1, at 582-88. 
27. 479 U.S. 104 (1986). 
28. 653 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
29. Snyder & Kauper, supra note 1, at 585. 
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must proceed to the merits. "30 In a similar vein, they state: 
In cases seeking to enjoin mergers of firms competing with the plain-
tiff, courts must struggle with proof of potential predation. . . . How 
proximate must such acts be? Presumably plaintiff must do more than 
allege such future acts. But neither the Supreme Court nor lower courts 
have offered guidance on such questions. The mere act of pleading that 
such conduct is likely will apparently carry the plaintiff a long way into 
the litigation.31 
This account of the state of the law is at best incomplete. 
Although Cargill rejected the contention that competitor plaintiffs 
should never be permitted to challenge mergers, it did, contrary to 
Snyder and Kauper's suggestion, provide extended dicta "offering gui-
dance" on how to identify antitrust injury in such a setting.32 The 
Court made clear, as it had already done in Matsushita Electric Indus-
trial Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 33 that it generally accepted the Chi-
cago analysis of predatory pricing, which views claims of predatory 
pricing with great skepticism: "Claims of threatened injury from 
predatory pricing must, of course, be evaluated with care."34 In Mat-
sushita, the Court required a greater than usual evidentiary showing to 
survive a summary judgment motion where the plaintiff's allegations 
were inherently implausible, as in the case of predatory pricing.35 
Likewise, under Cargill's standards, bare allegations of threatened 
predatory pricing are inadequate to establish antitrust injury; the cir-
cumstances must be such as to make such an allegation credible. 
"Courts should not find allegations of predatory pricing credible when 
the alleged predator is incapable of successfully pursuing a predatory 
scheme."36 The Court in Cargill emphasized that the merging firms' 
28.4% postmerger market share would have made predatory pricing 
impossible. Moreover, the Court specifically admonished courts hear-
ing such cases to take account of postmerger entry barriers, because an 
allegation of likely successful predatory pricing would be implausible if 
firms could easily reenter the market when the alleged predator would 
supposedly be seeking to recoup. 37 One district court's dubious inter-
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 587 (footnote omitted). 
32. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 119 n.15. 
33. 475 U.S. 574, 588-90 (1986). 
34. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 121 n.17. The Court continued: "[T]he obstacles to the successful 
execution of a strategy of predation are manifold, and .•• the disincentives to engage in such a 
strategy are accordingly numerous." 479 U.S. at 121 n.17 (citing the leading Chicago 
commentators). 
35. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 596-97. 
36. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 120 n.15. 
37. In evaluating entry barriers in the context of a predatory pricing claim, however, a 
court should focus on whether significant entry barriers would exist after the merged firm 
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pretation of the Court's admonitions is insUfficient to dismiss antitrust 
injury as a legitimate filter for competitor plaintiffs. 
The Court's recent decision in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petro-
leum Co. 38 (ARCO) emphasizes once again that a competitor may not 
satisfy the antitrust injury requirement merely by alleging that a viola-
tion occurred and that it harmed the competitor in some way. More 
importantly, the case illustrates plaintiffs' difficulties in tailoring alle-
gations to satisfy the antitrust injury requirement. The plaintiff's en-
tire case in ARCO rested on ARCO's alleged violation of the 
Albrecht39 rule prohibiting maximum resale price fixing. The Court 
found that none of the supposed rationales for the Albrecht rule sup-
ported a finding of antitrust injury to a competitor. To satisfy ARCO, 
a competitor will have to meet the extraordinary burden of plausibly 
alleging a campaign of predation against retail service stations. 
In our view, Tasty Baking's interpretation of the Cargill standards 
was questionable at best. Similarly disturbing was the Second Cir-
cuit's Bigelow decision, 40 which reversed the district court's grant of 
summary judgment to defendants on the competitor's request for a 
preliminary injunction against a merger. The appellate court found 
that a merger creating a firm with an eighty-four percent market share 
created a "presumption" of antitrust injury to competitors, 41 despite 
the district court's finding in the same case that there was no evidence 
of a likelihood of predation. 42 Tasty Baking and Bigelow, however, are 
of dubious vitality. Other cases have been truer to the Court's admo-
nitions in Cargill 43 It is especially unlikely that Bigelow's presump-
had eliminated some of its rivals, because at that point the remaining firms would begin to 
charge supracompetitive prices, and the barriers that existed during the competitive condi-
tions might well prove insignificant. 
479 U.S. at 120 n.15; see also Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 
F.2d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[P]redatory pricing must involve in addition to some level of 
below-cost pricing that is harmful to competition, the rational expectation of later realizing mo-
nopoly profits. The failure to show this additional aspect is fatal."); A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. 
Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbook, J.) (In a predatory 
pricing case, "[o]nly if a market structure makes recoupment feasible need a court inquire into 
the relation between price and cost."), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990). 
38. 495 U.S. 328 (1990). 
39. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
40. R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 815 
(1989). 
41. 867 F.2d at 111 ("Market share data ••. constitute[] sufficient evidence •.• of antitrust 
injury to a competitor to create a genuine issue for trial.") (citing Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston 
Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250, 1265 (E.D. Pa. 1987)). 
42. See R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 689 F. Supp. 76, 80-81 (D. Conn. 1988), revd., 
867 F.2d 102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 815 (1989). 
43. See, e.g., Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 842 F.2d 95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
486 U.S. 1023 (1988); see also Ansell Inc. v. Schmid Labs., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 467, 484-85 
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tion that a high market share implies injury to competitors survives 
ARCO. 
The litigation in Remington Products, Inc. v. North American 
Philips Corp. 44 is instructive on this point. There, the plaintiff sought 
damages as a result of a completed merger of its competitors. The 
district court initially granted defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment under Cargill then reversed itself following Bigelow. 45 Recently, 
however, the district court reversed itself once again on the basis of 
ARCO, concluding that Bigelow's presumption that an illegal merger 
would inflict antitrust injury on a competitor did not survive AR CO. 46 
The evolving standards of antitrust injury appear to provide a "lesson 
for competitor plaintiffs" that is quite different from the one Snyder 
and Kauper draw. Mere allegations of predatory intent will not suf-
fice, and the likelihood of a court's finding antitrust injury from a 
merger of one's competitors is remote, even when the defendant's mar-
ket share is quite high. 
The key issue in all of this is whether courts, using the antitrust 
injury doctrine to focus litigation on the efficiency consequences of 
practices, can distinguish anticompetitive exclusion from efficient 
practices at a sufficiently early stage in the proceedings to prevent per-
verse competitors' suits. Unmeritorious suits that survive summary 
judgment increase congestion in an already overburdened court sys-
tem. Moreover, the cost of defending such suits may lead to inefficient 
settlements. Courts may ameliorate many of these difficulties by rul-
ing expeditiously on summary judgment motions; Snyder and Kauper 
suggest, however, that they cannot: 
[P]laintiffs claiming injuries through strategic or predatory actions of 
their competitors are likely to satisfy the antitrust injury requirement 
once the facts establishing the violation are shown. The courts tend to 
presume that the factual premise of the claim is valid and then inquire 
whether the plaintiffs stand to suffer antitrust injury from the alleged 
behavior. Because the antitrust injury requirement is not likely to serve 
as a significant limitation on such actions, plaintiffs suing direct competi-
tors may be expected to shape their complaints to conform to current 
theories of predation or raising rivals' costs. Such complaints are likely 
to withstand initial scrutiny; the question of antitrust injury in these 
cases will often be determined only when the underlying question of vio-
lation is resolved. As a result, the antitrust injury requirement is not 
(D.N.J. 1991) (finding injury from "marketing clout" or popularity of competing brand not anti· 
trust injury). 
44. 717 F. Supp. 36 (D. Conn. 1989). 
45. 717 F. Supp. at 48-49. 
46. Remington Prods., Inc. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 755 F. Supp. 52, 57-58 (D. Conn. 
1991). 
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likely to curb the type of suits most likely to be filed against competitors 
to restrain competition: those based on allegations that what is in reality 
aggressive and effective competition is a form of predatory or exclusion-
ary conduct.47 
This passage again suggests that antitrust injury's requirement that the 
plaintiff allege some credible link between its harm and a genuinely 
anticompetitive exclusionary practice is of no consequence, because 
the plaintiff may simply allege whatever the court wants to hear. But 
in most cases no credible allegations of what Snyder and Kauper call 
the "necessary conditions" for successful exclusion will be possible. In 
ARCO, for example, the plaintiffs could hardly have plausibly alleged 
a predatory pricing scheme given a market with virtually no entry 
barriers. 48 
Snyder and Kauper suggest that such unmeritorious cases will 
nonetheless be filed, and that only a rule completely barring competi-
tor suits will be effective.49 But no rule, not even the one recom-
mended by Snyder and Kauper, can absolutely prevent a firm from 
filing a baseless lawsuit. The question must be whether the legal sys-
tem has at its disposal a means of deterring such suits by making the 
prospective gains from filing them less than the prospective costs. The 
courts must, in other words, be able to weed out baseless suits at an 
early stage of the litigation or to impose sanctions that deter their fil-
ing in the first place. 
Courts need not dismiss cases on the pleadings to meet this condi-
tion. Snyder and Kauper indicate that if the plaintiff survives a mo-
tion to dismiss the case must proceed "to the merits." But cases may 
be won on the merits without a trial. Under the Court's current stan-
dards, the defendant need only show the absence of adequate proof in 
the record of an essential element of the plaintiff's claim to win sum-
47. Snyder & Kauper, supra note 1, at 587. 
48. Plaintiff will, however, apparently have the opportunity to try. On remand from the 
Supreme Court's decision in ARCO, the Ninth Circuit majority found that the district court must 
hear plaintiff's predatory pricing claim, despite the dissent's persuasive argument that plaintiff 
had abandoned it. USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 87-5681, 1992 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 18445 (9th Cir. Apr. 16, 1992). Still more dubiously, the majority found that plaintiff 
need not show that there was a dangerous probability that the alleged predatory pricing would 
succeed, reasoning that the "dangerous probability" standard applies only to § 2 cases. 1992 
U.S. App. LEXIS 18445 at *15. Although dangerous probability is indeed a§ 2 requirement, in 
a broader sense it is inseparable from any coherent definition of predatory pricing. A price can-
not be predatory unless the defendant will probably be successful in recouping the losses it suffers 
during the predatory campaign by setting supracompetitive prices after plaintiff is driven from 
the market. 
49. See Snyder & Kauper, supra note 1, at 587-88, 596-97. For an argument to the opposite 
effect, from the opposite ideological viewpoint, see John B. McArthur & Thomas W. Paterson, 
The Effects of Monsanto, Matsushita, and Sharp on the Plaintiff's Incentive to Sue, 23 CONN. L. 
REV. 333 (1991). 
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mary judgment. so After AR CO, discovery can focus on issues of mar-
ket power and entry barriers, facilitating early disposition of 
unmeritorious cases. s1 
The increased availability of summary judgment, especially since 
Matsushita, has had a dramatic effect on antitrust litigation. One sur-
vey of reported summary judgment decisions in antitrust conspiracy 
cases since Matsushita found that sixty-four of the decisions granted 
summary judgment while only thirteen denied it - and one of those 
thirteen denials was the Ninth Circuit's decision in ARCO that the 
Supreme Court later reversed. 52 While judges are admittedly more 
likely to write opinions when granting rather than denying summary 
judgment, these figures are impressive. Snyder and Kauper's state-
ment that the number of summary judgment motions granted "is still 
low"53 is bewildering. To be sure, summary judgment normally comes 
only after some discovery and so may entail significant costs to the 
defendant. But few plaintiffs file suit with the knowledge that they will 
lose on summary judgment. Those who do so risk sanctions under 
Rule 11. 54 The number of private antitrust cases filed per year has 
plummeted by almost two thirds since 1980,55 in part for these 
reasons. 
Even if summary judgment is denied, the proceedings need not be 
unduly protracted. In Ansell Inc. v. Schmid Laboratories, Inc., 56 a 
merger agreement was signed on August 28, 1990, and a competitor's 
suit challenging the merger was filed on September 13, 1990. The 
court denied summary judgment on November 13, 1990, but began 
hearings on plaintiff's application for a permanent injunction the same 
day. The court heard evidence on three days over the following three 
weeks and rendered its decision denying relief (on antitrust injury 
grounds) on February 27, 1991, barely six months after the signing of 
50. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 
51. See Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 133 F.R.D. 41, 45 (D. Nev. 1990) (limiting 
discovery, in light of ARCO, to issues of monopoly power and entry barriers, because relevance 
of other discovery was contingent on these issues). 
52. Harry Zirlin, Note, Summary Judgment in Federal Court: New Maxims for a Familiar 
Rule, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 201, 218 & n.125 (1989). 
53. Snyder & Kauper, supra note 1, at 559 n.37. 
54. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985). For an 
argument that the standards for Rule 11 sanctions in antitrust cases are still too lenient, see 
Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation: A Golden Anniversary J'iew 
of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1023, 1056-59 (1989). Louis recommends increased use of attorney fee 
shifting. Id. at 1059-61. Such a measure may involve chilling some legitimate claims, as Louis 
recognizes, but it falls far short of cutting off those claims entirely. 
55. See Blecher, supra note 25, at 17 n.2. 
56. 757 F. Supp. 467 (D.N.J. 1991). 
October 1992] Co"espondence 121 
the merger agreement.57 Clearly, the federal courts can move expedi-
tiously when the case demands it. 
Snyder and Kauper's own data suggest that courts have terminated 
most competitor suits either on the pleadings or on summary judg-
ment. Moreover, their own review of fairly limited information about 
the cases leads them to conclude that only a small percentage are meri-
torious. Why should courts, properly guided by the appropriate eco-
nomic understanding and the available legal mechanisms, be unable to 
do the same? If courts were to apply Snyder and Kauper's standards 
of classical market power and high entry barriers, they might be able 
to do a more effective job in weeding out perverse suits than they have 
done in the past using traditional judicial methods. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF RAISING Riv ALS' COSTS 
Snyder and Kauper concede that summary judgment based upon 
the requirement of market power "is becoming common in a variety of 
antitrust cases."58 They nonetheless believe that summary judgment 
will be ineffective in the future, even in tandem with the antitrust in-
jury requirement, in controlling perverse competitors' suits because of 
the special dangers posed by the literature on raising rivals' costs: 
But as competitor plaintiffs seek to work their way around the anti-
trust injury requirement, they are also likely to seize upon evolving theo-
ries of nonprice predation based upon proof of conduct that raises rivals' 
costs. The rationale of the Monfort case suggests that such allegations, if 
proved, may well establish antitrust injury. Control of these actions 
through summary judgment could prove difficult given the generality of 
the economics literature on exclusionary practices. Moreover, . . . even 
when such firms employ exclusionary devices and the injury to rivals is 
clear cut, the economics literature on exclusion of rivals indicates that 
consumers' welfare may be enhanced rather than harmed. 59 
The argument here appears to be that the problem of perverse suits is 
likely to get worse in the future because of the ambiguities of the eco-
nomic literature on raising rivals' costs; therefore, we should cut off all 
competitors' suits as a prophylactic measure. 
This argument faces three difficulties. First, the concept of raising 
rivals' costs has not yet had a significant effect on antitrust litigation. 
Despite antitrust scholars' preoccupation with raising rivals' costs, 
only a few cases have used the term, and the leading law review article 
advancing the notion as a basis for liability has been cited by a court 
57. 757 F. Supp. at 469. Still more impressive, a new judge was assigned to the case after the 
second hearing day. 757 F. Supp. at 469 n.1. 
58. Snyder & Kauper, supra note 1, at 588. 
59. Id. 
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exactly once, five years ago. 60 Moreover, the number of private anti-
trust cases filed has fallen dramatically in recent years, 61 suggesting 
that the present federal judiciary is not particularly receptive to inno-
vative theories of liability.62 
Second, Snyder and Kauper's argument addresses the problem 
posed by the literature on raising rivals' costs in an indiscriminate 
way. Let us grant that plaintiffs are likely to assert the new theories of 
anticompetitive exclusion in the future to circumvent the antitrust in-
jury requirement. Let us also concede Snyder and Kauper's argument 
that the observable conditions for many of those theories, particularly 
those dealing with vertical integration or exclusive contracts, are as 
consistent with enhancement of consumer welfare as with anticompe-
titive exclusion. These premises do not compel the conclusion that all 
competitor suits should be foreclosed. The concerns Snyder and 
Kauper raise relate to the new theories of anticompetitive exclusion 
themselves, not to the antitrust injury doctrine. Snyder and Kauper 
recognize that some exclusionary practices are demonstrably anticom-
petitive. If the practices described in the literature on raising rivals' 
costs stand outside that category, the proper legal response is to reject 
those theories as a basis for liability.63 And again, there seems little 
reason to fear that the present federal judiciary will not demand the 
necessary proof of inefficient exclusion. 64 
Finally, Snyder and Kauper's argument against the theories of 
raising rivals' costs applies regardless of who enforces them, competi-
tors or public enforcement agencies. Their suggestion that competi-
tors are less likely than public enforcers to exercise suitable discretion 
in filing antitrust suits is therefore irrelevant: The theories, on Snyder 
60. Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Assn., 814 F.2d 358, 368 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (citing Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Rais-
ing Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986)). The article has, of 
course, been cited by dozens of commentators. 
61. See Blecher, supra note 25, at 17 n.2. 
62. See generally William E. Kovacic, Reagan's Judicial Appointees and Antitrust in the 
1990s, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 49 (1991). 
63. Several commentators have criticized the raising rivals' costs theories as adding little or 
nothing to traditional antitrust analysis of anticompetitive exclusion. See, e.g., Timothy J. Bren-
nan, Understanding "Raising Rivals' Costs," 33 ANrrrRUST BULL. 95, 113 (1988); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Restricted Distribution, and the Market for Exclusionary Rights, 71 
MINN. L. REv. 1293, 1295 (1987); Wesley J. Liebeler, What Are the Alternatives to Chicago?, 
1987 DUKE L.J. 879, 894; see also John E. Lopatka & Paul E. Godek, Another Look at Alcoa: 
Raising Rivals' Costs Does Not Improve the View, 35 J,L. & EcoN. (forthcoming Oct. 1992). For 
further discussion, see Nonprice Predation Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 1991 A.B.A. SEC. 
ANrrrRUST L. MONOGRAPH 18. 
64. For a good example of the courts' skepticism, see Ansell Inc. v. Schmid Labs., Inc., 757 
F. Supp. 467, 484-85 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding that injury from "marketing clout" or popularity of 
competing brand displacing plaintiff's product from shelves was not antitrust injury). 
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and Kauper's account, offer no basis for distinguishing anticompetitive 
from procompetitive practices.65 Moreover, the enforcement agencies 
are no more likely to be skeptical of the relevant theories. After all, 
economists at the Federal Trade Commission - Steven Salop and 
David Scheffman - have played the leading role in producing and 
promoting the literature on raising rivals' costs. 
CONCLUSION 
We have argued that Snyder and Kauper ignored the evolutionary 
nature of legal change in interpreting from data showing that competi-
tor suits were filed equally frequently before and after Brunswick. 
Snyder and Kauper's proposed solution suffers from the same failing. 
Cutting off all competitor suits prevents the courts from responding to 
theoretical developments in traditional ways. Undoubtedly, courts 
have been misled by fashionable theoretical developments. But anti-
trust policy and academic industrial organization economics have in-
teracted productively for over a century.66 Antitrust has provided the 
subject matter for much of the empirical and theoretical work of in-
dustrial organization, which has in turn contributed to the develop-
ment of antitrust. Snyder and Kauper's argument is insufficient to 
justify abandonment of a major part of that joint enterprise. 
65. Others have made the same observation. See, e.g., Stephen Calkins, Comments on Pres-
entation of Steven C Sa/op, 56 ANTrrRusr L.J. 65, 68-69 (1987); Frank H. Easterbrook, A/locat-
ing Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 16 GEO. L.J. 305, 314 (1987) (arguing that Krattenmaker 
and Salop's analysis "does not contain a single example that would support a confident conclu-
sion that firms raised rivals' costs in a way that permitted them to increase their own prices and 
profits"). 
66. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial 
Organization, 68 TEXAS L. REV. 105 (1989). 
